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Introduction 
“...With all due respect, this is not an accounting. It’s a summary accounting. For example, you 
didn’t write any dates, and many of the items are vague. The analysis of the summary shows the 
following:  
1. You received a total of $22,301. Of course, you didn’t mention the period over which this sum 
was received. Our activities only benefited from a negligible portion of the money. This means 
that you received and distributed the money as you please....  
2. Salaries amounted to $10,085—45 percent of the money. I had told you in my fax ...that we’ve 
been receiving only half salaries for five months. What is your reaction or response to this?  
3. Loans amounted to $2,190. Why did you give out loans? Didn’t I give clear orders to 
Muhammad Saleh to ...refer any loan requests to me? We have already had long discussions on 
this topic...  
4. Why have guesthouse expenses amounted to $1,573 when only Yunis is there, and he can be 
accommodated without the need for a guesthouse?” 
—Ayman Al-Zawahiri, e-mail to Yemeni cell, February 11, 1999.[2]  
Standard accounts of terrorist financial and logistical systems stress the efficiency with which 
terrorist financial networks distribute funds while operating through a variety of covert channels. 
Because of the covert nature of their work, these networks must operate with fewer checks and 
balances than most financial organizations require.[3] Indeed, the cellular structure of terrorist 
networks so often cited in the literature necessarily implies that leaders will be poorly informed 
about the actions of their subordinates. If we assume that all the members of the network are 
uniformly committed to the cause and that they all agree on how best to advance the group’s 
political goals, then there is no inconsistency here. However, if leaders, middlemen, and 
operational cadres have divergent preferences over spending, then the information asymmetries 
created by the secretive nature of terrorist networks lead to myriad opportunities for spending 
money differently than leaders would like. 
While, the evidence is mixed regarding disagreements between key terrorist leaders, there is 
good reason to believe that the preferences of middlemen are not always aligned with those of 
leaders and operational elements. Mid-level managers of organizations such as Harakat ul-
Mujahedin (HUM), a Pakistani militant group focused on Kashmir, often live luxurious lives far 
beyond what their followers can afford.[4] Captured PLO documents show that those who plan 
attacks are paid eight times as much as is given to the families of those who die carrying out the 
attacks.[5] People running criminal fund-raising operations in the United States for Hezbollah 
drive luxury cars and live in upper-middle class neighborhoods.[6] In 1999, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
sent an operative to Malaysia and the Philippines to buy guns as part of a plot to kill then 
Indonesian vice-president Megawati Sukarnoputri. While the operative reported that he couldn’t 
get the weapons back into Indonesia, JI claims he stole the money.[7] During the Christian-
Muslim violence in Poso in late 2000, a relatively senior JI member arranged to raise funds from 
oil company workers to be channeled through one local militia, KOMPAK-Solo, to JI and another 
local militia, Mujahidin KOMPAK. The workers were so concerned about the probity of these 
transfers that they appointed an auditor to oversee the funds.[8] Arguments betweens moderates 
and extremists over strategy frequently occur in organizations contemplating making peace with 
the government.[9] 
This chapter offers a perspective for analyzing such variations in the motivations of terrorists. 
Terrorist groups face two adverse selection problems. The first is that those likely to survive long 
in terrorist networks tend to be less ideologically committed as they are less likely to volunteer for 
the most dangerous missions.[10] The second is that because participation as a financier or 
logistician is less risky than participating as a local leader or operator, middlemen in terrorist 
organizations will tend to be less committed.  
These two dynamics create problems for leaders. For security reasons, leaders—principals—
have to delegate fundraising and financial duties to middlemen—agents. However, the agents 
can take advantage of the information asymmetries in the network to expropriate some funds. 
Because the environment is noisy and security concerns prevent perfect monitoring, principals 
are uncertain whether the agents are passing on all the resources they bring in or are keeping a 
cut for themselves; a classic moral hazard problem. Leaders can solve this problem by providing 
enough money to middlemen so that, after the logisticians take their cut, the optimal amount still 
makes it to the operators. However, doing so is inefficient. Alternatively, leaders can try to reduce 
inefficiency. 
There are at least four inefficiency-reducing solutions to this moral hazard problem. First, leaders 
can engage in monitoring or auditing of their middlemen. Second, leaders can provide incentive-
based compensation, withholding payment for services until they have observed a signal—a 
successful attack for example—telling them the agent has performed as promised. Third, leaders 
can engage in punishment strategies when they have evidence of shirking. Fourth, leaders can 
encourage members to enter into relationships that raise the costs of getting caught expropriating 
funds.  
Unfortunately for the terrorists, each of those strategies creates vulnerabilities. The first two 
demand that the group conducts additional communications and keep records; both of which 
violate operational security concerns. The third strategy is risky both because it entails additional 
communications and because the punished individual may decide to compromise the network.[11]  
The fourth strategy creates additional interconnections, making the potential costs of any one 
compromise much greater. Thus given the selection dynamics caused by government strategy, 
terrorist face an inherent trade-off between security and efficiency. 
In order to better flesh out these arguments, the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a 
model of the economics of terrorism and discusses the role of terrorist financial systems. Section 
II discusses terrorist motivation in more detail and links them to the selection mechanisms. 
Section III focuses on the principal-agent dilemma in covert organizations. Section IV 
demonstrates that strategies to ameliorate principal-agent dilemmas create vulnerabilities for 
terrorist organizations. Section V summarizes the argument and discusses policies to make the 
security/efficiency trade-off more problematic for terrorist leaders. 
I: The Economic System of Terror 
This section provides a way of thinking about the strategic decisions of terrorist leaders and the 
role of financial systems in those decisions. Decisions about spending are best be understood in 
terms of the trade-off between achieving political impact and the fact that the greater a group’s 
impact, the greater government enforcement efforts. Figure 1 demonstrates the logic.[12] 
Leadership seeks a level of political impact where the marginal benefits of one more unit of 
impact matches the marginal costs in terms of government action. 
Unlike traditional economic organizations, this optimal point is not always determined by a 
spending constraint. Terrorist groups rely on five distinct sources of funding:  
1. Direct contributions from individuals;  
2. Intentional donations from charitable foundations;  
3. State sponsorship;  
4. Profits from legitimate businesses—including tithing by the membership; and  
5. Profits from criminal enterprises—including skimming funds from legitimate organizations 
and extortion from individuals.  
Production decisions, choices about how many attacks to undertake or how much to spend on 
providing social service, influence the first three sources. In general, the more attacks or social 
services a group provides, the more funds it can raise from individuals, charities or state 
sponsors.[13] However, the last two sources enable some groups to produce at this goal-optimal 
level even if their financial system is inefficient.[14] 
Whatever impact the leader desires, the financial system has three basic tasks. First, it must 
generate resources through fundraising, taxing criminal activities, fraud, or some other source. 
Second, this value must be preserved and protected from seizure. Finally, the money must be 
distributed to operational cells. As I show in section III, there are opportunities for middlemen to 
appropriate resources at each step in this chain. In the next section, we will look at why 
middlemen are likely to be exactly the type of individuals who would want to do so. 
II: Selection Dynamics and Divergent Preferences  
One of the most striking patterns to emerge from a close examination of terrorist organizations is 
that financial network members face dramatically lower risks than local leaders or tactical 
operatives. Beyond not being asked to participate in risky or inherently fatal ventures, they are 
less likely to be targeted by government forces. When targeted, they are less likely to be killed. 
And when arrested, they face more lenient treatment.  
Marc Sageman's biographical and network data on participants in the “global Salafi jihad”—Al 
Qaeda and affiliated organizations—was used to assess the risks of participating at different 
levels. The data are based on biographical studies of 366 individuals collected from open-source 
material and include information on when individuals joined, to whom they were connected at that 
time, their role in the jihad, to whom they were connected after joining, when they left the jihad, 
and how they left.[15] According to this data, the rate of death for logisticians has been one third 
of that for those involved in operational cells for 2001-2003.[16] The capture rate for logisticians 
has also been lower than that faced by tactical operatives, 2002 being a notable exception. Table 
1 provides a summary of survival rates by occupation in the global salafi jihad.[17] 
Even when government succeeds in capturing logisticians and other support network members, 
they face dramatically lower consequences than operators. Of the 29 financiers and logisticians 
removed from the global salafi jihad between January 2001 and December 2003, only 3 were 
killed. A particularly telling example is the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cell broken up in Singapore in 
late 2001. The cell provided fund-raising services to JI and was engaged in making logistical 
arrangements for an Al Qaeda attack in Singapore. Of the 30 plus people arrested, the 13 
engaged in direct logistical support each received two years in prison. Those engaged in fund-
raising activities were released but not permitted to leave the country.[18]  
This section explains why this dramatic difference in risks leads to divergent preferences in 
terrorist organizations. First, it presents a simple, rationalist model of why people participate in 
terrorist organizations. Second, it shows how the adverse selection process inherent in terrorist 
operations leads to divergent preferences. Third, it shows why the process of recruiting new 
terrorists leads to divergence under a realistic set of assumptions.  
The basic framework for this paper is that individuals join terrorist organizations when the utility of 
doing so is at least as good as that provided by their next best option.[19] Utility is composed of 
two components. First, individuals get utility out of doing what they believe is right, in this case out 
of the impact of their actions in furthering the group’s goals.[20] Second, individuals get utility out 
of monetary compensation, their wages. Each individual places a weight on these two 
components such that the sum of the weights is one. The utility of an action is the probability it 
yields an impact, I, times the weight placed on impact plus the probability it yields wages, W, time 
the weight placed on wages.[21] We can then describe the population of potential members by 
the distribution of weights in the population. At the extremes are individuals who are purely 
motivated by impact, suicide bombers perhaps, and those motivated purely by money. 
Within this framework, consider a hierarchical organization where individuals come up through 
the ranks, starting out in subordinate roles and moving into management roles as local leaders, 
financial facilitators, or logisticians.[22] Throughout their careers, these individuals will have 
opportunities to volunteer for risky missions.[23] Those most likely to do so will be those who 
place the highest weight on impact. Thus, the longer individuals remain in the organization, and 
the further they move up the management structure, the more likely they are to place a heavy 
weight on monetary rewards.[24] Of course, there is a countervailing dynamic. Assuming 
constant wages, those who are less committed will receive lower total utility from participating and 
will thus be more likely to quit the group.[25] Where the value of participating is only marginally 
greater than the value of the next best option, quitting should mitigate this particular adverse 
selection process.  
Even without this adve rse selection process, there is reason to expect divergence. The lenient 
treatment observed for support network members means that the threshold level of risk 
acceptance and commitment required for participation in support activities is much lower than for 
participation in tactical roles. Recall that there is a distribution of weights in the population of 
potential members. Thus given set wages for different activities, individuals placing a certain 
weight on economic considerations might participate in support activities while balking at other 
roles within the organization. Seeking to maximize operational capability, a rational organization 
would concentrate such individuals in support roles, freeing up the true believers for riskier 
operational duties. These personnel decisions would then lead to consistent variance between 
levels of the organization.  
A reasonable objection to the above logic is that groups would not engage in such centrally-
directed personnel movements because they create connections between cells. Because of this 
security consideration, terrorist organizations may actually recruit directly into specific positions 
with little opportunity for movement. Suppose that the organization in question filled these roles 
using a strategy of recruitment through existing social ties.[26] Any member tasked with the 
recruitment and early ideological training of potential members will have access to a limited 
population. From this population, he will need to fill various spots. If we make the reasonable 
assumption that belief in a group's ideology follows some bell-shaped distribution--the purely 
ideological or purely venal types are rarer than those who place moderate weight on both 
pecuniary rewards and impact—it will be harder for the recruiter to find potential tactical 
operatives than logisticians. Unless the recruiter knows a surfeit of potential members, he will 
place individuals in the riskiest position they will accept. Thus individuals will rarely be more 
ideologically motivated than is necessary given the risk level of their occupation, leading to 
variance across levels. 
A second, more significant objection to the above logic is that if middlemen have scarce skills, 
their next best option will be much more valuable. Thus their involvement in terrorism may 
actually suggest they are more committed than the foot soldiers who have no other employment 
activities.[27] However, evidence from the Kashmiri militant groups suggests this objection may 
not hold. There, there are numerous reports of middlemen living relatively ostentatious 
lifestyles.[28] If they were in fact more committed, one would expect them to reserve their wealth 
for the cause. 
Different levels of risks faced by those filling different roles will translate into different preferences 
within groups under three different sets of assumptions about how terrorist organizations make 
staffing decisions. The next sub-section looks at how this diversity, combined with the covert 
nature of terrorist organizations, creates a problem for terrorist leaders. 
III: Moral Hazard in Covert Organizations  
The relationship between terrorist leaders and their financial networks can be understood in terms 
of a principal-agent relationship where the principals, terrorist leaders, need to delegate certain 
tasks—raising funds and distributing them to operational elements—to their agents, the financial 
network. This delegation entails a risk that if the agents’ preferences differ from those of the 
principal, the agents will not carry out their tasks exactly as the principal would like, they may 
“shirk”. The moral hazard is that the agent can undertake actions that reduce the principal’s utility, 
but the principal can neither perfectly monitor the agent nor can he punish the agent with 
certainty.[29]  
Traditional organizations use three general strategies to deal with this type of problem. First, they 
audit their employees, accepting monitoring costs to prevent shirking. Second, they create wage 
schemes that are attractive only to agents whose preferences are aligned with the principals. 
Third, they provide incentive pay or condition salary on performance. There are many possible 
screening mechanisms and incentive-based contracts, but all involve making full payment 
somehow conditional on not deviating too far from the principal’s desires. 
This section applies this framework to terrorist financial systems. Terrorist leaders are the 
principals, and the members of the financial network are the agents. First, I describe what 
information is held by both principals and agents in this game. Second, I describe the private 
information held by both players. Third, I describe three ways in which this private information 
creates opportunities for agents to take advantage of the principals. 
Both principals and agents hold five pieces of information. Principals know the amount passed to 
leaders through fundraising activities and each agent knows how much he has passed on. 
Likewise, principals know the amount given to financial network members to pass on to 
operational elements, while each agent only knows how much he was given. Both principals and 
agents are able to observe the operational impact of their actions. They also share common 
beliefs about the amount of impact they can achieve given spending levels and the likelihood of 
achieving that amount. Finally, both are able to observe how risky it is to fulfill certain roles. 
There are three critical pieces of information in this game known only to the agents. Only the 
financiers know the percentage of funds raised that is actually passed up to the leadership.[30] 
Similarly, only the financiers know the amount passed down to the operational elements. Finally, 
the principal does not know how much weight the agent places on impact. I assume that impact 
dominates the leader’s decisions, but he is not so myopic as to spend an infinite amount to 
achieve his ideal level of impact. 
Given who knows what, there are three ways financial network members can take advantage of 
their private information. First, they can misrepresent their preferences over money and impact to 
pad their salary. Essentially, they can mislead the principal into thinking that he has to offer more 
compensation than he actually does. This problem will be ameliorated to the extent that there is a 
market for terrorist financial services.  
Second, the agent can appropriate some of the money from fundraising activities. Because the 
environment is noisy and the network is covert, the leader will be poorly-informed about the actual 
amount raised. Depending on the leader’s beliefs about how accurately he can anticipate fund-
raising levels, the agent will be able to get away with appropriating some amount without arousing 
suspicion. The size of this threshold will depend on the accuracy of the principals’ beliefs, which 
depends in turn on where the funds are coming from. When money from legitimate enterprises is 
passed through the group to operational cells, the process can be relatively overt. Because the 
organization is putting good money to ambiguous purposes—at least until the cell commits an 
attack—the transactions are essentially indistinguishable from legitimate transfers.[31] As such, 
the principal will be better informed about the likely success of fundraising efforts and the agent 
will not be able to appropriate as large a percentage. However, when the organization is using 
money from illicit purposes to fund operations, some kind of laundering will be needed to prevent 
investigators tracking the original crime from finding out about impending operations. This is a 
riskier proposition, involving more financial machinations and a greater need for secrecy; hence 
the principal will be less well informed about his returns to fundraising. As such, the financiers will 
be able to appropriate a larger percentage without arousing suspicion.[32]  
Third, the agent can appropriate money intended for operational cells. Whether these 
appropriations lead to underfunding of specific operations depends on the nature of the command 
and control structure.[33] As this book is focused on the role of financial systems, consider the 
case where the leaders decide on how many attacks to carry out and allocate funds to each 
attack based on their beliefs about how to equate the marginal returns to impact with marginal 
costs.[34] Because the principal’s ability to observe the impact to cost relationship is imperfect, 
members of the financial network can skim some of the money intended for operations and blame 
the low observed impact on the noisy environment.  
If opportunities for shirking exist in terrorist organizations, the next question is to ask whether 
financial agents will take advantage of these opportunities. Consider the case of an agent who is 
participating because his utility from wages and impact are better than his next best option. This 
agent knows he can appropriate some funds and get away with it, thereby increasing his 
utility.[35] Now consider the leader. He has some optimal level of impact that we assume to be 
below the maximum he could achieve if he spent all his funds.[36] He is uncertain whether he is 
dealing with a good agent who will pass everything on, or a bad one who will appropriate as much 
as he can get away with. Since the leader’s utility function is heavily weighted towards impact, 
and since he can spend above the point of diminishing marginal returns, he is willing to provide 
some extra wages to the agent. He knows the agent will appropriate these funds, but takes the 
efficiency loss because the agent will then pass the ideal amount on to the operational group. 
Thus the leader should pay what he needs to for his optimal impact, plus the minimum amount 
that can be appropriated without his becoming suspicious. The agent then appropriates this 
amount and passes the optimal amount of funds on to the operators. The leader remains unable 
to tell whether he is dealing with a good or a bad agent and the system moves on. In a more 
formal presentation, this would be the “shirking” equilibrium. 
In the terrorist leader’s perfect world, where the agents shared his preferences exactly, all the 
money raised would be passed to the organization and all the money intended for operations 
would be used as desired. However, selection dynamics mean there is likely to be a difference 
between the weights placed on impact and wages at different levels of the organization. This 
difference can lead the agents in the financial network to shirk by appropriating some funds for 
personal use, introducing inefficiencies into the financial system. In the next section, we will see 
how a security tradeoff arises from each strategy leaders use to deal with these problems. 
IV: Creating Vulnerabilities  
Terrorist leaders can undertake a number of strategies to minimize inefficiencies due to shirking, 
each of which create specific vulnerabilities. This section looks briefly at six of those strategies 
and discusses the security-efficiency tradeoff in more detail. The first two strategies, auditing and 
providing funds on a need-to-have basis, apply primarily to the process of moving money to 
operators. The remaining four strategies apply more generally. 
Auditing strategies—apparently employed by Ayman Al`Zawahiri—require the agents to provide 
periodic, detailed reports on their spending. Such reports provide the leadership with more 
detailed information about how their money is being spent. This additional information effectively 
reduces the noisiness of the environment, narrowing the scope of cheating available to the agent. 
The additional efficiency comes at the cost of additional communications. Because each 
communication entails a specific risk of compromise, this strategy effectively raises the marginal 
cost curve, reducing the total impact a group will desire. Thus we should not expect groups who 
have a surplus of funds to employ such a strategy.[37] 
Providing funds only on a need-to-have basis is another way in which principals can inhibit 
cheating by their agents. By increasing the frequency of transfers and reducing their size, leaders 
build up better knowledge about the nature of the spending-impact relationship.[38] This reduces 
the size of expropriations the agents can get away with. Because each additional transfer entails 
communications, the previous security tradeoff applies and again, leaders who have a surplus of 
funds are unlikely to employ this strategy. 
Punishment strategies depend on the principal’s ability to: (1) catch; and (2) credibly punish 
shirking. As already noted, getting the information needed to increase the probability of catching 
shirking has a security cost, so the focus here is on the second requirement, credible punishment. 
Punishment can be as simple as excluding the agent from future transactions. The agent then 
loses the difference between the future value of participation and that of his second-best option. 
Where economic opportunity is low, this difference could be quite substantial, so such a strategy 
may be sufficient. Because such a strategy is built into the shirking equilibrium in section III, the 
principal may want to use the threat of additional violent punishment, a punitive strategy.  
This strategy is harder to implement, because the agent in a covert system holds an inherent 
threat over the organization. If he is too dissatisfied with his punishment, he can go to the 
authorities. For example, Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl who testified in the African Embassy bombing trial 
had stolen money from Al Qaeda, got caught, went on the run, and approached the U.S. 
government in an attempt to save himself and his family. Because agents have exactly this option, 
punitive strategies should only exist where the organization can wield a credible threat of violence 
over the agent. Financial agents operating in foreign countries, such as the Yemeni recipient of 
al-Zawahiri’s e-mail, will be less susceptible to this strategy. That agent responded to being called 
out by quitting the network, illustrating the difficulties transnational groups face in using 
punishment strategies.[39] 
One common way to discourage shirking is to encourage members to enter into trust-inducing 
relationships such as marriage.[40] The logic is that those who have entered into such 
relationships will face a larger cost if they are caught cheating. Not only do they lose a future 
income stream, but familial and community connections as well. Such a strategy is central to the 
success of the hawala funds transfer system.[41] Of course, if a member embedded in a dense 
network of strong ties is captured, myriad opportunities for compromise are created. Historically, 
governments have only worked aggressively through terrorists’ non-operational relationships, 
targeting terrorists’ friends and family, when the impact of a terrorist campaign is very large.[42] 
Thus, rather than raising the marginal cost curve across its entire domain, this strategy increases 
its slope at high levels of impact. If the cost and benefit curves intersect at low levels of impact, 
such a strategy may not entail a significant loss in acceptable impact and is likely to be used. If 
the curves intersect at higher levels of impact, but the slope of the cost curve is small, then 
increasing its slope can yield a substantial decrease in the equilibrium level of impact. Finally, if 
the curves intersect at high levels of impact where the slope of the cost curve is already quite 
steep, then an increase in slope will not greatly decrease the optimal level of impact. Is it worth 
noting that many groups use this strategy, suggesting two possibilities. First, the curves could 
intersect for many groups at low levels of impact. This would be consistent with the finding that 
terrorist groups rarely achieve their avowed political goals.[43] Second, the curves commonly 
intersect where the marginal cost curve is steep, perhaps where government actions are already 
starting to bite. 
Incentive -base contracts offer another way for principals to reduce shirking. In the terrorism 
context, such an agreement could entail several different arrangements. One is that payments 
might be made only after successful attacks or other impact producing activities.[44] Another 
strategy might entail allowing financiers a set wage once they raise a specific amount. This wage 
has to be greater than the expected utility of appropriations given the amount raised. Because the 
appropriation entails some risk of being caught, the incentive can be less than the amount the 
agent could appropriate. Thus principals should prefer this strategy to overpaying to account for 
shirking. While these strategies do entail additional communications, they require fewer than the 
first two strategies. Thus incentive-based contracts raise the cost curve less and should be 
employed more often.  
Finally, terrorist leaders may seek to screen their recruits for ideological purity, to ensure that they 
all place a very high weight on impact. Some accounts suggest that the training program in 
Afghanistan served as such a screening process for Al Qaeda.[45] The lengthy ideological 
debates that form an essential part of the recruiting process in European Islamic ex-patriot 
communities may also fulfill such a function. While this strategy does not generate additional risks 
it does reduce the pool of potential participants. For groups recruiting from a limited recruiting 
population, this may be problematic. Also, the best financiers are unlikely to be religious or 
ideological purists. Such individuals rarely spend time developing the financial expertise needed 
to launder money and covertly move funds. This strategy then entails a cost in efficiency, and so 
may not be preferred to the status-quo. In other words, the efficiency loss from this strategy may 
drop the feasible level of impact below that which could be achieved with less impact-driven 
agents. 
Of the six strategies outlined above, all entail some cost for the groups. In five of the six, there 
was a specific security-efficiency tradeoff. Only demanding ideological purity did not have a clear 
security cost. However, in the realm of terrorist financing the necessary expertise may not be 
available from highly ideological individuals. Thus that strategy will only be available to some 
groups. The next section discusses some specific government strategies that can make the 
security-efficiency trade-off more problematic for terrorist organizations. 
Conclusion 
This paper developed a rational-choice perspective on terrorist organizations. In a principal-agent 
framework, leaders are considered the principals who delegate three-stages of financial activity to 
agents. Agents raise funds, store them for future use and transfer them to operational elements. 
Two selection processes cause those agents to have divergent preferences from the principals. 
First, terrorist organizations face an inherent adverse selection problem because those 
individuals who are less committed are likely to survive longer and rise into the mid-level positions. 
Second, because terrorist financiers face significantly lower risks than other members of their 
organizations, recruiting efforts will place more risk-averse, less committed individuals into 
financial roles.  
 
Because of the information asymmetries inherent in covert networks, these individuals have 
opportunities to “shirk” by skimming money at all three stages. So long as terrorist financiers face 
lower risks than other members of terrorist organizations, these groups will suffer from a moral 
hazard problem. “Shirking” by the agents creates inefficiencies in the financial system. Like any 
organization, terrorist groups can use a variety of strategies to control the moral hazard problem. 
All these strategies come at a cost. In five of six strategies examined, there was a specific 
security-efficiency tradeoff. Strategies that reduce the moral-hazard problem create vulnerabilities. 
Terrorist leaders thus face an unpalatable choice.[46] Where funding constraints do not bite, 
terrorists can make the tradeoff in favor of security. Where funding constraints do bit, government 
can undertake some specific actions to make this tradeoff even more problematic. This analysis 
leads to three distinct recommendations: 
First, governments should not publicize the freezing of funds. If funds are frozen without public 
statement, then financiers must explain how the money was lost. In the framework of section III, 
the organization will now achieve a lower impact. Seeing this, the principal will suspect the agent 
of shirking. If the freezing is made public, the agent has an excuse. If it is not, he has two choices: 
he can make up the frozen amount, or he can get blamed and forego the future value of his 
relationship with the organization.  
Second, government can make engaging in trust-inducing relationships more risky. Publicly 
targeting relatives and extended families for surveillance would increase terrorists’ assessment of 
the probability that such relationships would lead to compromise. The same end can be achieved 
by publicizing counter-terror successes based on tracing such relationship.  
Third, government may actually reduce tensions in terrorist organizations by engaging in 
economic development activities. Greater development in recruiting areas effectively increases 
the value of an individual’s second best option, thus the wages required to induce participation 
will be higher. While this may make recruiting more difficult, the moral hazard problem becomes 
less problematic from the principals’ perspective. Because the difference between the wage they 
must pay and the feasible expropriations is smaller, the absolute value of the inefficiencies is 
reduced. Under this scenario, the group is less likely to engage in the inefficiency-reducing 
strategies that create vulnerabilities, making government’s job more difficult. Whether this trade-
off—difficulty recruiting but fewer security violations—is favorable to government will depend on 
local conditions. 
Each of these strategies impinges on other areas of counter-terrorism and cuts in several 
directions. For example, publicizing methods and causes of compromise may aide terrorist’s 
efforts to improve their operational security, but may also prevent them from dealing with 
inefficiencies in their financial system. Of course, this dilemma and others discussed above only 
bite when funds are restricted.  
Based on this framework clamping down on finances can have a host of benefits. So long as 
groups have excess funds, they do not need to face the tradeoffs outlined above. However, when 
funding becomes scarce, terrorist leaders face a security-efficiency tradeoff. Choosing efficiency-
enhancing strategies creates vulnerabilities which government can use. Choosing security means 
fewer operations, less impact. In either case, government wins when funds are restricted. 
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